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Constitutional Law-FLORIDA BAR ADMISSION RULE REQUIRING
GOOD MORAL CHARACTER DOES NOT DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF THE FED-
ERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT IN VIOLATION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION-Florida Board of Bar Examiners re
Groot, 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978); Florida Board of Bar Examiners
re G.WL., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978).
Florida Board of Bar Examiners re Groot' and Florida Board of
Bar Examiners re G. W.L.I are excellent examples of the Florida
Supreme Court's exercise of its power to assure that prospective
attorneys in the State of Florida are of good moral character. 3 In
each case, the determination of good moral character was based on
the circumstances of the applicant's filing of a voluntary petition for
bankruptcy.' This comment will consider whether the holdings of
these cases tend to defeat the purpose of the federal Bankruptcy
Act5 in violation of the supremacy clause of the United States Con-
stitution.'
Groot and G.W.L. were both denied recommendation for admis-
sion to the bar by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners after the
Board had completed an investigation into their character and fit-
ness. The Board found the circumstances of each applicant's volun-
1. 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978).
2. 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978).
3. The Florida Supreme Court derives its power to regulate the state's practicing attor-
neys from art. V, § 15 of the Florida Constitution. Good moral character is a prerequisite for
admission to the Florida Bar.
No person shall be recommended by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners . . .
for admission to The Florida Bar unless he first produces satisfactory evidence to
the Board that he is of good moral character, . . . and is otherwise a fit person to
take the oath and perform the obligations and responsibilities of an attorney.
FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISS. R. IV, § 19. The Florida Supreme Court has defined good moral
character as "acts and conduct which would cause a reasonable man to have substantial
doubts about an individual's honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for
the laws of the state and nation." G. WL., 364 So. 2d at 458. While such a broad definition
may be attacked as being too ambiguous, it seems that an attempt to define good moral
character with absolute precision could lead to unjust application of inflexible standards.
4. Groot, 365 So. 2d at 168; G. WL., 364 So. 2d at 457-59.
5. These cases were decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255
(1970). On Nov. 6, 1978, the President signed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 which
becomes effective Oct. 1, 1979. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549-2657 (1978) (to be codified
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326).
6. U.S.CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy issue was raised by Justice Hatchett's dissent-
ing opinion in G. W L.:
The majority's suggestion that a prospective lawyer seeking release from bank-
ruptcy must consider future employment prospects before filing his petition places
a "chilling" effect on his exercise of his right to be "freed from debt" and invades
areas exclusively reserved for federal action under Article I, Section 8, of the Consti-
tution of the United States.
364 So. 2d at 461.
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tary petition for bankruptcy to be evidence of a lack of good moral
character.7 Both applicants petitioned the Florida Supreme Court
to review the Board's findings.
The Board's investigation into G.W.L.'s background revealed
that he had filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy three days
before he graduated from law school. Of the approximately $9,900
of debts which were discharged in G.W.L.'s bankruptcy proceeding,
only one debt of $8.01 was due at the time G.W.L. filed his petition
for bankruptcy. The remaining debts consisted of student loans
used to finance a portion of G.W.L.'s undergraduate and legal edu-'
cation and were not due to mature until nine months after G.W.L.'s
graduation. After an informal hearing before the Board, in which
G.W.L. was given an opportunity to clarify the circumstances of his
voluntary petition for bankruptcy, the Board withheld its recom-
mendation for G.W.L.'s admission to the bar. Although G.W.L.
voluntarily reassumed the discharged debts shortly after this infor-
mal hearing, the Board still found that G.W.L. lacked the requisite
good moral character for admission to the bar because he had filed
for bankruptcy before thoroughly testing the job market and before
the overwhelming majority of his debts were due. 8
The Board's investigation of Groot's character and fitness re-
vealed that he had filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy four-
teen months after he graduated from law school and seven weeks
after he had submitted his application for admission to the bar. The
investigation further revealed that twice in the nine months prior
to Groot's filing for bankruptcy he had voluntarily terminated his
gainful employment and had relocated his domicile to a different
state. He had also incurred approximately $900 in debts for medical
and gasoline credit charges. Groot petitioned for bankruptcy to dis-
charge these debts, along with approximately $8,530 in government-
guaranteed student loans which he had secured to finance a portion
of his undergraduate and legal education. Moreover, one week after
he filed for bankruptcy and over two months before he received his
discharge, Groot had accepted the position of staff director of the
Florida House of Representatives Committee on Standards and
Conduct at an annual salary of $18,000. Based on these findings, the
Board concluded that there was serious doubt as to Groot's good
faith in incurring the discharged debts and in his subsequent filing
for bankruptcy.'
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the Board's recommendation
7. Groot, 365 So. 2d at 165; G.W.L., 364 So. 2d at 455.
8. 364 So. 2d at 456-57.
9. 365 So. 2d at 166.
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to deny G.W.L. admission to the bar because his petition for bank-
ruptcy had been filed "unjustifiably precipitous[ly] " and "with
absolutely no regard for his moral responsibility to his creditors."' 0
However, the court admitted Groot to the bar, notwithstanding the
Board's recommendation. The court noted that, unlike G.W.L.,
Groot had several dependents and had been forced to borrow money
from members of his family to cover his living expenses while unem-
plqyed. The court also noted there was no evidence that Groot's
itineracy during the nine months prior to his filing for bankruptcy
had been the result of unethical motives. The court held that, al-
though Groot filed for bankruptcy at the very time he attained the
capability to begin repayment, Groot's petition for bankruptcy was
warranted due to his "unusual misfortune" prior to filing for bank-
ruptcy and his need to apply his total income to current obliga-
tions."
To determine whether the holdings in these two cases violate the
supremacy clause, it is necessary to establish whether they defeat
the purpose of the federal Bankruptcy Act.' 2 The United States
Supreme Court has developed a two-pronged test for making this
determination: first, both the federal statute and the state court
rule must be construed; and, second, it must be determined whether
the two are in conflict. 3 If a conflict were found to exist between the
federal law and the state rule, the state rule would be invalid as
violative of the supremacy clause.
It is well settled that the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to give
unfortunate debtors a "new opportunity in life."' 4 The United
States Congress has now codified this purpose in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978.'5 The new statute will expressly forbid a govern-
mental unit to discriminate against a bankrupt with respect to em-
ployment or the issuance of licenses, permits, charters, franchises,
or other such grants solely because of the person's status as a bank-
10. 364 So. 2d at 459.
11. 365 So. 2d at 167-68.
12. As noted by the Court in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971): "[OJur function is
to determine whether a challenged state statute 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Id. at 649 (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
13. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971). "Deciding whether a state statute is in
conflict with a federal statute and hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause is essentially
a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determin-
ing the constitutional question whether they are in conflict."
14. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234, 244 (1934)); accord, Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918); Williams v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915).
15. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 525, 92 Stat. 2593 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 525).
19791
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rupt or failure to pay a discharged debt."
The purpose of the Florida Supreme Court rule relating to admis-
sion to the bar is equally clear. By requiring every applicant admit-
ted to the bar to be of good moral character, the court has as its
objective the promotion of the public's confidence in the bar and the
protection of the public from unscrupulous attorneys. 7 The court
has noted that because the practice of law is very technical in na-
ture, it provides an unethical attorney with numerous opportunities
to defraud clients or impede the progress of justice. Denying admis-
sion to the bar based on a finding that an applicant has exhibited a
lack of good moral character in the past is presumed to decrease the
number of potentially unethical attorneys.' 8
In construing the state rule, however, it is necessary to look be-
yond the stated purpose and examine its practical effect.'9 As ap-
plied in these two cases, the rule resulted in one bankrupt being
delayed in his admission to the practice of law in the state and the
other being denied completely the right to practice law in the state
unless he could present affirmative evidence of his good moral char-
acter. 0 In both cases, the deleterious effect was the result of an
evaluation of the applicant's motives in voluntarily filing for bank-
ruptcy and the sufficiency of the applicant's need to have his debts
discharged.
At first blush, it would appear that a conflict does, in fact, exist
between the federal statute and the state rule. Both G.W.L. and
Groot were clearly hindered in making a "fresh start." However,
upon closer analysis of the extent of the new opportunity intended
for bankrupts, there is significant evidence that indicates the Flor-
ida Supreme Court acted within the scope of its authority and that
the bar admission rule applied to G.W.L. and Groot is valid.
The United States Supreme Court ruled in Perez v. Campbell2'
that a state could not enact laws that discriminate against bank-
16. While the United States Supreme Court ruling in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637
(1971) was limited to the "principle that any state legislation which frustrates the full effec-
tiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause," id. at 652 (emphasis
supplied), Congress is extending the bankrupt's protection by expressly barring employment
discrimination by any governmental unit. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, § 525, 92 Stat. 2593 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 525). Both the Florida Bar and
the Florida Board of Bar Examiners will fall. within the broad category of "governmental
units." Id. § 101(21), 92 Stat. 2552 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(21)).
17. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 358 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 1978).
18. Id.
19. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971).
20. G.W.L. was denied admission to the bar without prejudice "to apply for a formal
hearing before the Board to present evidence of his present good moral character." 364 So.
2d at 460.
21. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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rupts solely because of their status as a bankrupt. The essence of
that seminal decision was that a state is precluded from using its
power to coerce bankrupts to reassume the debts discharged in
bankruptcy." This principle has been applied by state and federal
courts to strike down state and local laws as well as agency rules
that discriminate against bankrupts by denying them employment
or licenses solely because discharged debts remain unpaid." Stat-
utes and rules which exert pressure on bankrupts to reassurhe their
discharged debts violate the supremacy clause because they defeat
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. In such a situation "a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt" is not
achieved for the bankrupt.24
That the Florida Supreme Court did not use its power to coerce
applicants to the bar to reassume their discharged debts becomes
apparent upon a close examination of G. W.L. and Groot. After
G.W.L.'s informal hearing before the Board of Bar Examiners to
clarify the circumstances of his filing for bankruptcy, G.W.L. volun-
tarily reassumed his discharged debts. 25 This reassumption of debt
was plainly not the objective of the court as G.W.L. was ultimately
denied admission to the bar. On the other hand, Groot never reas-
sumed his discharged debts and yet he was admitted to the bar. It
is thus apparent that the court was not using its power to defeat the
effect of these bar applicants' bankruptcy discharges. Therefore,
these Florida Supreme Court rulings, which look to the factual cir-
cumstances of an applicant's voluntary petition for bankruptcy to
22. In Perez, the Supreme Court struck down a state financial responsibility statute
because it gave judgment creditors "a powerful weapon with which to force bankrupts to pay
their debts despite their discharge." Id. at 654. However, it has been noted "that a state law
which falls short of coercing payment will not conflict with the Bankruptcy Act." Note,
Supremacy of the Bankruptcy Act: The New Standard of Perez v. Campbell, 40 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 764, 771 (1972).
23. See, e.g., Rutledge v. City of Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. La. 1975) (police
department rule that provided for potential dismissal of police officer for declaring bank-
ruptcy ruled invalid); In re Perkins, 3 F. Supp. 697 (N.D.N.Y. 1933) (state statute that
provided for suspension of license of a motorist found guilty of negligently operating his motor
vehicle until judgment was paid, notwithstanding judgment debtor's filing for bankruptcy,
ruled invalid); In re Hicks, 133 F. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1905) (municipal ordinance that provided
for the dismissal of a fireman for failure to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy ruled
invalid); Grimes v. Hoschler, 525 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975) (state
statute that provided for disciplinary action against a licensed contractor for failure to fully
pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy ruled invalid); In re Loftin, 327 So. 2d 543 (La. 2d Ct.
of App.), cert. denied, 331 So. 2d 851 (La. 1976) (fire department rule that provided for
potential dismissal of a fireman for declaring bankruptcy ruled invalid).
24. Perez, 402 U.S. at 648 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
25. 364 So. 2d at 456.
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determine whether the applicant is of good moral character, do not
violate the supremacy clause.2"
CAROLYN SONGER RAEPPLE
26. In a case that closely parallels Groot and G.W.L., the Minnesota Supreme Court
recently suggested that the Florida Supreme Court may have violated the supremacy clause
by basing its decisions on bar admission on the circumstances of the applicants' voluntarily
filing for bankruptcy. Application of Gahn, 279 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. 1979) (en banc). The
Minnesota court stated that its denial of Gahn's admission to the bar was "in no way influ-
enced by an assessment of Gahn's motivation in seeking bankruptcy." Id. at 832. Rather, the
court stated its decision was based "solely on the circumstances surrounding Gahan's default
on the student loans and the resulting failure to satisfy this important obligation." id. The
distinction drawn by the Minnesota court to separate its decision from the Florida decisions
was between a court examining the circumstances of an applicant's filing for bankruptcy to
discharge financial obligations and a court examining the circumstances of an applicant's
defaulting on financial obligations regardless of their discharge in bankruptcy. Upon close
analysis, this distinction proves to be little more than semantics and should not be the
determinative factor in an assessment of whether a bar applicant's right to file bankruptcy
has been infringed. Instead, the focus of such an assessment should be on whether the state
used its power to coerce the applicant to reassume the debts.
